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Abstract
The question whether technological progress displaces employment or whether technological
advance is beneficial for the level of employment has been in the core of economic dispute for
over two centuries. The beneficial might be achieved by several compensation mechanisms
within the economic system. In this paper we categorize these compensation mechanisms into
two basic categories that reflect the different nature of the ideas ruling the compensation. We
discriminate the mechanisms employment despite of innovation from employment via
innovation.
In the context of new innovation economics we model an artificial industry implementing
both compensation mechanisms. Simulation analysis is used to examine the short run and the
long run properties of the model. There we focus on the influence of wage restraint policy on
the functioning of the compensation mechanism.
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1. Introduction
Ever since economics became a science, technological advance has been on the research
agenda questioning among other things whether it is a determinant of decreasing employment
or whether new jobs are created by it. In the 90s, when mass unemployment became a crucial
problem for nearly all industrialized countries, particularly for Europe this issue has become
even more pressing. One of the often mentioned reasons for the non satisfactory employment
situation is that in an economic environment characterized by fast technological change the
factor labor is increasingly displaced by new technologies.
In search of a scientific explanation for this phenomenon neoclassical economists mainly refer
to price rigidities and especially to reduced downward flexibility of wages that hinder
(neo)classical compensation mechanisms
1 from working appropriately. According to this line
of reasoning larger employment could be reestablished by reducing the price of labor, or -
putting it dynamically - by reducing the wage growth rates, which may not exceed
productivity growth. The ideas governing this argument could be labeled 'employment despite
of innovation'. However, the claim for such a moderate development of wages, although
obviously favoring employment in the first place, seems to be unbalanced concerning the
importance attributed to the introduction of new technologies, nowadays. In this respect a
further compensation mechanism, recently formalized by Katsoulacos (1984 and 1986), seems
to play a significant, or even a dominant role. In particular, this mechanism focuses on the
creation of employment by the introduction of product innovation. This could be termed
'employment via innovation'.
The aim of our paper is to introduce a formal setting which allows the incorporation of both
compensation mechanisms. Furthermore, it allows for testing their relevance in an artificial
industry. Drawing on models of the innovation process, including the concepts of uncertainty,
heterogeneity and knowledge, brought forth by Schumpeterian and evolutionary economics,
the analyst finds himself beyond the frontiers of an analytical treatment, and simulation
analysis becomes inevitable.
In this respect, the modeling framework of a dynamic heterogeneous oligopoly, introduced by
Cantner and Pyka (1998), represents a helpful setting for our intention to investigate the
relationship of innovation and employment on a sector level. Here, firms compete in two
dimensions: on the one hand, price competition propelled by process innovation, on the other
hand, quality competition driven by product innovation. In the production process firms
employ unskilled workers which are also responsible for process innovation through simple
learning curve effects. In the R&D laboratories firms employ engineers engaged in the
exploration of uncertain technological opportunities. Although firms are able to optimize
production decisions myopically, the allocation of R&D resources, however, cannot be subject
to an optimizing calculus. Instead, the concept of routines is invoked (Nelson / Winter 1982)
to model the firms' R&D engagement. In situations of 'unsatisfycing' profit development firms
are induced to modify their routines.
                                                
1 The term ‘compensation theory’ dates back to Karl Marx, having in mind the various kinds of compensation
discussed by classical economists. Neoclassical economists added another mechanism: compensation via the
decrease in wages (Wicksell 1967). For contemporary discussion on the issue Heertje (1978) revived the notion
of ‚compensation mechanisms‘.3
In the second section we start by introducing the basic concepts of modern innovation theory
which constitute the general framework in which the firms in our artificial industry operate.
Building on this, in the third section the simulation model is developed which is numerically
analyzed in section 4. In particular, we draw on a scenario-analysis. The scenarios will only
differ as to how the wages of the unskilled workers adjust to productivity improvements.
Wages in these two scenarios do not vary within the industry. In the first scenario the idea
employment despite of innovation prevails: the wages are kept down by a  gentlemen
agreement of the wage-bargaining actors. In the second scenario, however, wages follow the
average productivity development and set a precedent for the idea employment via innovation.
This approach allows us to compare employment figures and the technological development
among firms and scenarios. Furthermore the specific impacts of the different compensation
mechanisms are identified. On this basis, we are able to show that focusing only on factor-cost
reduction does not lead to sustained improvement of sector employment. But a thus induced
potential technological backwardness may lead to even worse employment problems in the
long run. Some conclusions and an outlook for further research are given in section 5.
2. Technological Development in the Perspective of Evolutionary Economics
In order to analyze the interplay of both compensation mechanisms employment despite of
innovation and  employment via innovation sketched in the introduction we first have to
introduce the idea of the innovation process as it is developed in new innovation economics.
This approach sharply differs from traditional approaches in neoclassical industrial economics
and finds its theoretical background in the paradigm of evolutionary economics. The
following paragraphs are supposed to briefly introduce some of the most important concepts
of the evolutionary-economic theory of technological development we draw upon in
constructing our simulation model.
2.1 Technological Opportunities
Invoking concepts of modern epistemology the process of technological development
generally is considered to show features of punctuated equilibria (Mokyr, 1990)
2. Whereas in
normal phases technological progress proceeds incrementally along specific technological
paths, there also exist irregular phases of strong turbulence questioning dominating
technological approaches (so-called competence destroying technological change (Tushman/
Anderson, 1986)) and being the origin of totally new possibilities of the technological
development.
The specific technological paths are characterized with the help of the concept of
technological opportunities which describe the development potentials of a specific
technology. An important feature of the technological opportunities of a single technology
(so-called  intensive technological opportunities (Coombs, 1988) is that they are not
unrestricted but are limited due to technological and scientific bottlenecks.
3 For firms moving
                                                
2 In this respect, many largely overlapping concepts exist, e.g. the paradigm/trajectory approach (Dosi, 1982),
innovation avenues and technological guideposts (Sahal, 1985).
3 In the literature, this relationship is known as Wolf’s Law, e.g. the endeavors of a further acceleration of
microprocessors by an increasing miniaturization of components is hampered by scientific bottlenecks. Those
occur in the form of quantum theoretic laws that prevent further miniaturization when the distance between
different components reached the size of an electron. This minimum distance proved to be necessary for a stable
electron flux.4
along a certain technological path this means that further progress is increasingly difficult to
achieve with advancement on this path. In other words, the intensive technological
opportunities become increasingly depleted by their exploitation. Accordingly, on the one
hand, they provide for a regular development of a technological strand, on the other hand,
however, they also provide only for limited possibilities of firms to struggle successfully in
competition characterized by strong innovative elements.
Yet, this does not mean that progress comes to rest whenever the intensive technological
opportunities are depleted. The technological opportunities of specific technological paths do
not co-exist unrelatedly but there are several feedback mechanisms to scientific progress and
advances in other technologies (Klevorick et al., 1987, 1995) which open up new potentials
for further development, discussed under the heading of extensive technological opportunities
(Coombs, 1988). Of course, escaping from the pressure of increasingly exploited intensive
technological opportunities via exploration of new extensive opportunities is a costly effort
and requires firms willing to invest resources in highly uncertain endeavors.
2.2 Technological Uncertainty
With uncertainty, the second important concept of modern innovation economics is touched
upon. Whereas the problem of technological uncertainty, always immanent in innovation
processes (see e.g. Witt, 1992) is avoided by traditional industrial economics by referring to
the concept of risk and drawing on expected values of a principally known innovation,
evolutionary approaches put significant weight on the emergence of true novelties, by their
very existence with unknown characteristics.
Referring to the above introduced concepts of intensive and extensive technological
opportunities, it becomes clear that both kinds of opportunities go hand in hand with
qualitatively different forms of technological uncertainty. Whereas the direction and impact of
exploiting the intensive opportunities along specific and well-defined technological paths can
be roughly anticipated, this does in no way apply to the exploration of the extensive
technological opportunity space.
Consequently, firms are no longer able to draw on an optimization calculus in their planning
of innovative endeavors and the assumption of perfect rationality has to be replaced by the
concept of an only  bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). For an  operationalization of this,
Nelson and Winter (1982) have introduced the notion of routines – decision rules underlying
innovation processes which are often described simply as rules of thumb deviated from past
experience and future expectations which, however, come very close to real firm decisions.
4
2.3 Knowledge
Dismissing the assumption of perfect rationality shows a further important consequence for
innovation processes heavily emphasized by modern innovation theory. Knowledge is
considered to be the basic ingredient for the development of true novelties and can no longer
                                                
4 See e.g. Silverberg and Verspagen (1994) „To provide some anecdotal evidence, we recall an interview with the
director of R&D of the Japanese firm Canon published in the Financial Times some years ago. The director
reported that the firm has some time before raised its R&D/turnover ratio from 11% to 11
1/2%. This appeared to
have been beneficial to the firm, so that the directors were now debating whether to cautiously raise it even
further.“5
simply be acquired by investing resources into R&D activities. Technological development
shows to be of a cumulative nature meaning that present technological improvements build on
successful innovation achieved in the past.
5 Accordingly, without acquiring previous
knowledge of a specific technological path the most recent developments cannot be
understood and transferred for own purposes. Accordingly, the innovative actors are
characterized by only imperfect capabilities which depend on their history, i.e. they are path-
dependent.
However, a  bit-by-bit cumulative technological change can also be punctuated by major
advance with the consequence that the technological capabilities developed so far lose their
importance and are displaced by new competencies. It is this feature of the technological shift,
leading to technological obsolescence of previous accumulated knowledge which Tushman
and Anderson (1986) have in mind, when they coined the notion of competence destroying
technological change. The introduction of an innovation, seen as a shift to a new
technological path, therefore, very likely means that an innovative firm has to depreciate
significant parts of the know-how it was drawing on in its previous production processes.
3. The Model
In the following section we want to briefly sketch the components of the simulation model
and the integration of the concepts of modern innovation economics introduced above. We
start with an outline of the underlying market mechanism.
- Demand and Market
Consumers can discriminate the goods produced in the industry by price and quality. Thus, the
demand relationship creates competition in price and quality space, where each dimension is
driven by a single force. Reduced costs of production allow firms to reduce prices and with it
to increase the number of units sold. Whereas rising quality, i.e. the introduction of a new
variety of the product characterized by higher quality, increases the consumers' valuation of
the products opening up the opportunity for firms to charge higher prices.
In their decisions concerning the output markets firms optimize myopically. They set the price
so as to maximize profits. On factor markets associated with production of the final goods the
decision is also subject to an optimizing calculus. On factor markets related to research,
however, firms employ routines.
As the goods are horizontally differentiated by quality we employ a model of a heterogeneous
oligopoly in the fashion of the one previously introduced by Cantner and Pyka (1998) to
represent the industry. The industry initially consists of n firms where each firm i faces a
linear demand relationship.
p a x d p i F it it it ijt jt
j i
j F




The reservation price  ait  depends on the product quality offered by firm i. It increases with
product quality, implying that higher quality leads to a higher willingness to pay for the goods.
                                                
5 See e.g. Nelson (1987).6
The index set of all firms in the oligopoly is denoted by F. Similar to Kuenne (1992) we
model this relationship between the integer quality qit  and reservation price ait  by
a a n it t
rq n ij t = ￿
- -
0
0 25 1 1 ( . /( ) ) S F i˛ " . (2)
The relative distance of firm i to firm j in quality space is given by rqijt , where the maximum
absolute distance is 1. The sign of  rqijt  is denoted  srqijt  indicating superior quality of firm i
relative to firm j by a positive value.
The price for a good in equation (1) is influenced by the prices of any other good j weighted
by  dijt  which in absolute terms declines with distance in quality space. The weighting factor
of the influence dijt  shown in figure 1 is defined as
d srq rq ijt it it = - ( ) 1 j i F j i „ ˛ " , , (3)
Figure 1 dijt dependent on the relative quality position rqit
In period t firm i sets the price  pit  based on competitors' prices  pit-1 of the previous period










































F i˛ " (5)
A few comments on the notation of (4) and (5) are necessary here.cit is firm i's average cost of
production and nt is the number of elements in the index set F and represents the number of
firms still being present in the oligopoly at time t.
- Production and Learning Curve Effects
The firms produce the final product with a constant returns to scale technology, where the
production function assumes that all capital goods are entirely represented by the labor
productivity lit (see e.g. Cooper and Haltiwanger, 1993; Tronti and Tanda, 1998).7
1 - ￿ ￿ =
t d
work
it it it n l x F i˛ " (6)
The amount of unskilled labor employed in the production process is 
work
it n , the capital stock
is physically depreciated with the rate d and the time the capital stock has been in use for is
denoted by t.
Several empirical investigations reveal a high correlation in the advent of product and process
innovation (Smolny, 1999, Rottmann and Ruschinski, 1998). So we assume the capital stock
of the firm to be replaced upon the arrival of product innovation. Therefore the rate  d  of
physical depreciation or obsolescence of the capital stock has no influence on the decision of
machine replacement. Hence the rate of depreciation of physical capital is set to 1 reducing
the production function to
work
it it it n l x ￿ = F i˛ " . (7)
Although in equation (7) labor productivity lit  of firm i is independent of the installation time
t of the capital stock and the quality level  qit  of the output produced, it is not completely
fixed. Experience is a source of continuous improvement of production processes (Arrow
1962) with a firm moving along its technological path, thereby exploiting the intensive
opportunity space. A simple learning curve relationship affecting the labor productivity
captures this learning-by-doing effect. Thus, in the model incremental technological progress
along a single technological path is approximated by improvements of labor productivity
which is determined by the cumulative output of a single product generation or quality level
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In equation (8) firm  i’s cumulative output is denoted by  xit
cum  and both  g  and  l  are
parameters. The formulation in (8) secures that doubling the cumulative output leads to an
approximate 2% to 3% increase in labor productivity.
Once the wage for the unskilled workers 
work
it w  is determined by the labor market below, the
average cost cit for firm i can be determined.
work
it it it w l c ￿ = / 1 F i˛ " (9)
Hence the profit that the oligopolist realizes in period t is
pit it it it p c x = - ( ) F i˛ " . (10)
- Shifts to new Technological Paths – Product Innovation
The  oligopolists are not only engaged in production activities but also engage in R&D
activities. Concerning the appropriation of profits a firm in the model finds itself confronted
with the situation that costly R&D personnel can be financed from  pit  or that he can please
shareholders by distributing the profit. This problem cannot be solved by an optimizing
calculus due to technological uncertainty but rather is it routines that are employed by the8
firm: a fraction of the profit denoted by sit  is spent on R&D personnel 
eng
it n  and the remaining
part (1-sit )￿pit  is distributed among shareholders. So, for a given  sit  the amount of R&D
expenditure strongly depends on the profit earned complying with both theoretical and
empirical evidence (e.g. Stiglitz, 1993, Smolny and Schneeweiss, 1999).
Although firms myopically optimize their production decisions, the firms are modeled with a
satisficing behavior with respect to their R&D efforts. Firms only change their strategies in
employing R&D personnel in cases when the gap between the desired and the realized result
exceeds a certain threshold. Gaps can basically open up in two directions. The gulch can be
caused by unfulfilled expectations of external factors like shareholders for instance (case 1),
or it can be an internal expectation gap (case 2). The different gaps, however, may call for
conflicting remedies. Both facets are present in the model; the firm changes the routines only
in two instances.
case 1 Once the oligopolist realizes a product innovation ( 1 - > it it q q ) it is time to devote a fair
share of the profits to the shareholders. Shareholders will urge the oligopolist to comply with
their notion of increasing the shareholder value and to buy into their understanding as  sit = 0
being the fair share. So whatever  sit  was before the product innovation occurred, all profits
will be distributed among the shareholders there after.
case 2 Once the oligopolist notices an undesirably low growth of the profit – below the
minimum expected rate r - he realizes that there is no room remaining to reduce the costs, the
intensive technological opportunities are depleted, and no more room for pleasing the
shareholders. New extensive technological opportunities have to be sought to secure the
existence of the firm. So a larger fraction of the profit has to be devoted to R&D.
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The expenditure on R&D can be used by firms as a strategic means to improve the
competitive position in the heterogeneous oligopoly by improving the firm's quality relative to
the quality produced by competitors. In this context a quality improvement is to be seen as the
exploration of new extensive opportunities which manifests itself in a product innovation. For
product innovation we do not distinguish whether (1) a quality level has been reached within
the oligopoly for the first time, i.e. the quality-leader improves his quality, or (2) the quality
level has already been present in the oligopoly, i.e. a firm other than the quality-leader catches
up and increases its quality level. Hence, in line with the concept of a cumulatively built up
knowledge base, we exclude the possibility of a simple imitation of external technologies. In
the context of our heterogeneous oligopoly the mean effort to improve from quality level k to
quality level l is equal for all firms no matter how many firms have undergone this quality
improvement before. One might argue that this is equivalent to assuming that the wheel has to
be reinvented over and over again. But, as we explicitly consider actors with imperfect
knowledge bases, simple imitation is not very likely to occur. Furthermore, for reasons of
simplicity, in the model, technological spillovers are excluded, what makes perfect imitation9
additionally not a very likely event.
6 Finally, by the very nature of the heterogeneous
oligopoly, the firms in the model never produce homogenous products.
Concerning product innovation firms are confronted with true technological uncertainty.
Regarding this, it becomes obvious why we draw on routinized behavior introduced above.
The relationship between the firms’ efforts to introduce a new product and the specific event
of a successful product innovation is not known to the firms in the oligopoly
7. However, firms
are aware that they have to be engaged in R&D and therefore employ R&D personnel 
eng
it n .
With the help of the accumulated knowledge by the engineers and scientists the probability to
successfully complete the exploration of the extensive technological opportunity space and to
introduce an innovation increases.
A product innovation occurs for firm  i, if the cumulated R&D employment exceeds a
randomly distributed threshold  qij . Additionally, not only the innovation process of a single
product innovation is cumulative, but also the sequence of different product innovations is
characterized by a strong cumulativeness and path dependency: to reach a certain quality
level, the firm has to master the preceding stages in order to accumulate the necessary
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Figure 2 The process of quality improvement
Once a product innovation occurs for a firm the knowledge gathered in the previous
production processes becomes obsolete and the respective firm again is confronted with low
labor productivity. However, also the intensive opportunity space is refreshed and offers new
possibilities for improving labor productivity. Further, in the ongoing search for new
technological opportunities, the previous knowledge accumulated in the exploration of
extensive technological opportunities in the R&D laboratories of the respective firm also
becomes obsolete. Accordingly, we consider the case of competence-destroying technological
progress, the knowledge stock of a firm is replaced every time a new product quality enters its
production and the workers' experience in manufacturing the old, lower-quality product
becomes outdated. To represent this formally, the initial value of the productivity is restored
by resetting the cumulated output variable.
                                                
6 „When imitation is attempted under conditions that permit only limited access to the thing being imitated, it
becomes very similar to innovation and of course is unlikely to yield an exact copy.“ (Winter, 1984, p. 292)
7 In this point, a particular advantage of the simulation technique shows up. Here it is possible to draw on
probability distributions, the statistical relationships are hidden from the actors in the model. In a standard
optimization approach this differentiation of the researcher and the modeled world is not possible.10
The threshold  qij , responsible for the event of a product innovation, is a random variable
generated by subtracting an exponentially distributed variable from a fixed limiting value. The
resulting distribution is sketched in figure 3.
- Labor Market
Now let us turn to the labor market. Both types of workers, the production workers and the
R&D personnel are hired on labor markets and are compensated by wage 
work




The wage for the R&D personnel firm i faces in t is driven by the corresponding changes in




































where  n and  e represent fixed parameters. The wage 
work w.  for the production workers,






























The variable  w i allows us to specify the influence of productivity changes on the wages,
where  [ ] w i ˛ 01 , . Hence  w i is the crucial variable to generate different scenarios as it
represents the degree of how much the collective wage bargaining actors like governments,
unions and employers have agreed on wage restraint in this sector. It can be seen as being
determined outside the model.
- Exit
In the case firm i has too large a distance to the quality leader and produces under costs that
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Figure 3 Distribution of the threshold variable11
goods market, it is forced to exit the industry. The exit removes i from the index set F that
contains the remaining firms in the industry.
At this point of the discussion all components of the model are specified. Now let us have a
look on the potential compensation mechanisms that are implemented in the model.
- Compensation Mechanisms in the Model
The continuous improvement of the production process causes labor productivity to increase
over time. Equation (7) shows that at a given output level employment decreases. This
displacement could be compensated by increasing output. This increase in output, however,
can be induced by declining prices in turn stimulated by falling cost (equation (5)). Depending
on the impact w i productivity changes have on wage formation the average cost of production
may fall with rising labor productivity. This relationship opens up the opportunity for the
compensation through price reductions  to be effective. It is at the same time a rough
representation of the compensation through falling wages.
On the other hand, we have customers with preference for new quality. New quality, i.e. new
products introduced by product innovation increase the willingness to pay for the goods
(equation (2)) and the amount of goods demanded. Product innovation offers the firms the
possibility to gain market shares and, consequently, may foster employment in this context.
This relationship portrays the compensation through new products.
4. Simulation Analysis
In the following section we want to explore, how the two different compensation mechanisms
are affected by different schemes of wage formation indicated by different values of the wage
restraint variable  w i. The two scenarios that we are going to examine, are polar cases.  w i
takes the value zero in scenario I for all firms in the industry. Thus productivity changes in the
industry have no influence on the wages 
work w. . All firms pay the same wages and the wages
are fixed to the initial level. This relationship represents the case of the wage bargaining actors
finding a consensus for extreme wage restraint. The wages are kept down artificially. In the
second scenario  w i is one for all firms. Accordingly, the average percentage productivity
change translates into percentage changes of the wages. The wage bargaining actors have
agreed, that wage restraint is not an issue in this very industry.
In order to closely inspect the behavior of the firms in the model we implement it into a
numerical computer simulation. The simulation is run for 1,500 periods on an artificial time
scale and the simulation is re-run 100 times. The results of the 100 runs are used to compute
the means to be presented in the following sections in order to avoid distortions due to the
several stochastic elements in the model (Monte-Carlo-Simulation). A sensitivity analysis of
our results with respect to parameter variations can be found in the appendix of this paper.
Table 1 summarizes the basic simulation layout.12
Table 1 Scenario I and scenario II
For any simulation run in any scenario we start with the same value for the strategic variables












Table 2 Initial values of sit
In the following section we are going to explore the situation of the individual oligopolist and
the whole industry in three dimensions – the economic, the technological and the employment
dimension. We will mainly focus on the different development processes along the time line
as to distinguish short- and long-run effects.
4.1 Economic Situation
Scenario I
First we want to observe the industry’s situation in the economic sphere as displayed by the
individual firm’s profits. In figure 4 the profits of all firms of the oligopoly are portrayed. For
explanational purposes, however, we concentrate on two selected firms only (firms 5, 10).
Firm 10 initially devoting the highest share to R&D (see table 2) on average is the first to
innovate and gains tremendously from early innovating. It realizes rising profits induced by
rising quality and increased consumers’ assessment until the competitors also improve their
quality and challenge the position of firm 10.
Scenario I Scenario II
Equations (2)-(13) (2)-(13)





No. of runs 100 100
















Figure 4 Scenario I - Profits
This development can be also detected by examining the costs. Figure 5 extracts the profit of
firm 10 and displays it in combination with the costs born by firm 10. Early innovation grants
the position of quality leadership to this firm enabling it to increase its market share
considerably. Thereby room to maneuver is opened up for firm 10 which is used to exploit the
intensive opportunities and increase productivity with rising cumulative output. The early
downswing of the costs on the first technological path is attributed to constantly improving
productivity. As firm 10 realizes that the intensive opportunities are exhausted it searches for
new extensive opportunities by rising the fraction spent on R&D. The rising costs in the
second stage around t=500 reflect the successful introduction of a product innovation by this
firm. A new product generation is introduced and due to the competence-destroying nature of
technical progress also low labor productivity characterizes the production of the new
commodity at early stages. However, due to a rich intensive opportunity space on this new
technological path, labor productivity improves with cumulated output. The firm is able to
reduce its costs again, however, now the cost-reduction does not completely translate into
increasing profits as also the competitors are able to switch to new technological paths. This
way, the price component in competition significantly gains in importance again. Fiercer
competition can not be compensated by cost reductions exclusively, and accordingly, profits


























Figure 5 Scenario I - profits and costs of the quality leader (firm 10)14
competition in the situation of profits declining too steeply. In this situation of fierce price
competition causing a sharply declining residual firms do not have the (financial) power to
accumulate enough R&D and build up new competencies to further explore the extensive





















Figure 6 Scenario I – profits and costs of a technologically lagging firm (firm 5)
In figure 6 the profits and costs of a firm which, with respect to the introduction of an
innovation, is technologically lagging are depicted. This firm 5 faces slightly increasing
profits in the beginning which are caused by the improvement of its labor productivity. With
the introduction of a product innovation of firm 10 around t=500 firm 5 is confronted with
slightly falling profits as now technological lagging firms lose demand in quality competition.
Figure 7 Scenario II – Profits
However, declining profits induce a change in the strategy variable to foster R&D, which
turns out to be successful a likewise early introduction of a new product increases profits
again. With this product innovation firm 5 catches up to the technology frontier and is able to
















are not yet able also to catch up. Like the leading firm 10, also firm 5 finally is not able to
escape declining profits on its second technological path in this scenario.
Scenario II In the second scenario the wages are no longer kept constant but are allowed to
rise with average labor productivity (wi=1). Figure 7 shows the development of profits of three
selected firms as well as the industry average profit development. Compared to the first
scenario as a first difference the jagged appearance of the curves is striking. The development
in this scenario does not show the regular character of the previous one but seems to include
quite different dynamics. Moreover, the firms in scenario II seem at least on average to be in
the position to maintain a positive trend in profit development.
In order to capture the processes behind this development figure 8 exemplarily shows the
costs and profits of a single firm (firm 10). Firms in scenario II do not face falling costs as
increasing productivity is on average absorbed by wage increases. Hence the profit situation
for firms in scenario II becomes unsatisfactory more quickly, causing the firms to change their
strategy earlier. Employment of R&D personnel starts to increase making the event of product
innovation more likely. There are no rising profits due to almost constant costs in the first
place. After around 250 periods the R&D efforts start to pay for firm 10. It manages to exploit
the extensive opportunities and introduces its first innovation. A better position in the quality























Figure 8 Profits and Costs of Firm10
To compare the economic situation of the whole industry we plot average industry profits in












Figure 9 : Average Profits of Firms in Scenario I and Scenario II
Although profits in scenario II look not that promising in the beginning firms start to search
for new opportunities and profits end up on a higher level compared to that in scenario I. The
only difference between scenario I and scenario II is, that in scenario I wages are not tied to
productivity improvement, whereas in scenario II average productivity gains fully translate
into increasing wages leaving costs almost constant. Wage restraint as modeled in scenario I
gives an incentive for firms to be content with the overall situation and concentrate efforts on
incremental improvements of process technologies and realizing profits. On the other hand,
wages growing with average productivity generate a stronger incentive for the firms to
improve also quality and to engage in risky and uncertain exploration of new extensive
technological opportunities. Striving for quality improvement represents a possibility to
escape price competition by emphasizing the quality component of competition. Price
competition leads to falling profits in the long run (figure 4 scenario I) whereas combining
price and quality competition opens up the possibility for increasing profits (figure 7
scenario II).
Technological Situation
The technological situation of an individual firm in the industry can be summarized by the
quality level produced; and so can the whole industry. The average quality level in our model
does not only indicate the technological situation concerning the product quality it also depicts













Figure 10 Average quality level produced.
As can be seen in figure 10, at any time beyond period t=300 superior technology can be
found in scenario II. Both the level of the technology and the pace of the technological
progress is higher for scenario II. The result indicates that wage restraint discourages product
innovation in our model causing technological backwardness for the industry in the long run.
We can also try to find a proxy for the age of the capital stock used by the firms. As the capital
stock in our model is technologically obsolete upon the arrival of a product innovation in the
guise of a higher product quality, the average probability for a product innovation gives a
proxy for the probability of a capital stock being replaced.
From the simulation results we compute the probability of a capital stock of a certain vintage
to be still in use in different time periods. In figure 11 we print the probability of a capital
stock being set up in period 20 and period 250 respectively to still be installed on all
remaining time periods.
One can see that at any time a capital stock installed in scenario II is more likely to be
removed than a capital stock in scenario I. Hence firms in scenario I tend to produce on an
older capital stock compared to firms in scenario II. We can conclude that wage restraint not

































Figure 11 Probability of a capital stock installed in t=20 (left) and t=250 (right) still
being installed in all remaining periods
Pace of change can be determined by the slope of the curve in the q-t-diagram. Here it is
higher for scenario II than for scenario I at any time of the simulation. Note that the rate of
technical change is not exogenously given but determined within the model.
4.3 The Employment Situation
To examine the employment effect of a wage restraint policy we may concentrate on the
average employment of 













Figure 12 Average employment of n
work worker
One detects that although starting from an equivalent level of employment both scenarios
exhibit different employment paths. In scenario I which models wage restraint average
employment rises from the beginning until the peak employment level is reached around
period t=750. Employment falls thereafter. In scenario II, however, where wage increases bid
away productivity gains induced by process innovation we detect falling employment in the
first place.
In the short run rising productivity and wage restraint, the dynamic equivalent of falling
wages, determine falling costs which in turn cause output to rise. The increase in output is
strong enough to (over-)compensate for the increased productivity and the employment
expands. Scenario II teaches us that abandoning the wage restraint policy, so giving up the
policy of falling wages, in this context means to have relatively constant costs although
learning curve effects rise productivity. Employment, however, is affected negatively by the
renouncement of wage restraint. Increasing productivity, while exploiting the intensive
opportunities, leads to reduced employment, as the compensation through reduced costs and
falling wages cannot work properly. Hence, employment falls.
Up to this point, say period 400 of our artificial time scale, we can tell the story about the
compensating and therefore positive employment effect of reduced costs and falling wages.
We can likewise tell the story of the disadvantageous employment results yield by wage
increases induced by productivity growth. We have therefore identified the ‘usual suspects’ as
being to blame for the negative employment situation in scenario II.19
In the long run, however, our model shows that the situation for the industry under the wage
restraint policy worsens. Wage restraint causes the productivity changes to fully translate into
average cost changes. This in turn creates too large an incentive for the firms to exploit the
intensive opportunities and compete only in the price dimension. By almost exclusively
relying on price competition the firms restrict their own clearance to build up competencies to
explore extensive opportunities. Hence the search for new quality to compete in both available
dimensions turns out to be underestimated in an environment characterized by wage restraint.
The compensation through falling wages and the compensation through cost reductions, that
secured employment in the short run cannot compensate for the employment effects in the
long run.
Firms in scenario II realize at an early point of time that price competition would reduce the
profit as an indicator of economic success, as the wage setting regime bids away any gains that
might occur through the learning curve effects. This leaves an incentive to search for new
technological paths. The endeavor proves to be successful to produce higher quality products
compared to firms in scenario I attracting consumers and increasing profits and employment.
Not relying on the compensation though falling costs and wages in the first place starts to pay
after a while when the long run effects of product innovation begin to work.
After having inspected the model one might not be sure that the story told about rising wages
and costs as the usual suspects still holds true in the long run. One might be inclined to argue
that in the long run recourse to the rising wages according to productivity improvements
might press firms to turn away from exploiting the intensive opportunities only. One might
even be inclined to state that the search for extensive opportunities induced by the usual
suspects is the driving force for guaranteeing employment in the long run.
As is the case in any simulation study the question arises as to what extent the model results
depend on the parameter values used for simulation. The sensitivity analysis of our model
documented in the appendix, however, shows that the results are quite robust concerning
simultaneous parameter perturbations affecting the demand and the technological sphere.
5. Conclusions
The paper provides a simulation analysis of a heterogeneous industry in order to investigate
short- and long-run impacts of technological innovation on employment. Competition is
characterized by two dimensions: on the one hand, price competition is responsible for firms
to gain market shares by reducing their costs via process innovation. On the other hand,
quality competition plays a major role, driven by product innovation which allows the firms to
differentiate from competitors and gain in consumers’ assessment. With respect to the
relationship of technological progress and employment the two opposed compensation
mechanisms discussed in the literature can be summarized under the heading employment
instead of innovation and employment via innovation. The aim of our paper is to include these
processes in a dynamic setting in order to understand how the compensation mechanisms
work and interact in the course of time.
Our results suggest that firms in an industry are able to enlarge the demand for their products
by decreasing the respective prices. This can be achieved by improving their production
technologies, i.e. increasing their productivity. The employment can be maintained or even
enlarged, although ever decreasing number of workers are necessary to produce the same level
of output, as long as demand at least grows enough to compensate the productivity effect on20
employment. In our model this exploitation of intensive technological opportunities is
implemented via a deterministic learning curve effect. However, firms can only reduce their
output prices if their input prices remain constant or change only moderately. With wages
oriented at productivity growth the possibility to reduce prices is excluded hampering the
compensation mechanism - employment despite of innovation - to work properly. Therefore, at
least in the short run constant or only moderate growing wages are a mean for guaranteeing
employment.
Besides this compensation mechanism which focuses on the dimension of price competition,
the second dimension of quality competition is considered to exert a certain influence on
employment, which, however, is not as immediately visible as the influence of reducing
production costs. In the case of constant wages, firms are able to realize considerable success
by paying attention more or less exclusively on price competition. In the case of wages
increasing with productivity the margin for reducing prices is much smaller and the economic
success of this strategy is continuously threatened by increasing factor costs. Here, firms are
exposed a stronger incentive to escape the pressure of pure price competition by
differentiating themselves from their competitors. This can be done by engaging in the
exploration of extensive technological opportunities and introducing a product innovation.
Due to the intrinsic uncertainty of this kind of innovation process the firms are no longer able
to optimize their decisions but draw on routinized behavior. With respect to the development
of the employment situation in this scenario, our model’s results suggest that in the long run
an industry continuously under wage pressure is able to employ more people than an industry,
where wages are kept down artificially, all other factors being equal. This sheds light on the
meaning of employment via innovation: the finally even increasing trend in employment is
maintained by a advanced capital stock in that industry.
Of course, our results have to be interpreted carefully. In our paper we are only discriminating
between two scenarios with constant and increasing wages, thereby implicitly assuming an
industry where technology plays an important role. It is quite obvious that our results are not
valid in technological more moderate environments.
In a way, in the model some of the reasoning of A. Kleinknecht (1998) is included.
Kleinknecht’s arguing on a national level shows that the Dutch consensus and wage restraint
oriented policy of loonmatigating in the last 15 years has had a quite negative effect on the
national efforts in R&D and the respective development of the technological basis of the
country, although the success of this policy on Dutch employment figures cannot be denied.
Following Kleinknecht, the Netherlands are now in a somewhat dangerous position, as with
only moderate exogenous shocks their economy is threatened by a decreased ability to adapt
to the changed situation which could cause serious problems on labor markets. Our model
captures the same mechanisms on a sectoral level within an economy and highlights the
importance of an adequate functioning of the Schumpeterian compensation mechanism
employment via innovation for a future positive development of employment.
In order to find empirical evidence for this kind of compensation mechanism on our agenda
for future work is the identification of sectors where employment strongly depends on the
introduction of new technologies. This can be done, on the one hand, with the help of industry
case studies, on the other hand, the combination of industry employment figures with
technology flow analysis seems to be a promising way.2122
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Appendix – Sensitivity Analysis
The two figures below show the results of a sensitivity analysis of the model, illustrating the
effect of parameter variation on the simulation results. The aim of a sensitivity analysis is to
investigate the behavior of the model given perturbations of the model’s parameters. As the
behavior of the model is driven by consumers’ valuation of new products and the changing
production technology due to process innovation we choose to perturbate a parameter of the
demand (a0) and a parameter of the production technology (g) simultaneously. The simulation
was carried out using various parameter combinations (a0’, g’) systematically drawn from the
parameter space with 90£a0’£110 and 4£g’£6. The resulting employment path was correlated
with the employment path reported in the paper, which represented the parameter vector
(100,5). The light shaded areas indicate parameter combinations that yield a correlation
coefficient larger than 0.9. whereas for the dark shaded area the correlation coefficient was at
least 0.8. The black dots indicate the parameter vector (100,5).
The sensitivity analysis was carried out for both scenarios. Figure 13 and figure 14 displays
the results for scenario I and scenario II, respectively.









Figure 13 Sensitivity of scenario I









Figure 14 Sensitivity of scenario II25